The Asian financial crisis spread its effect quickly across a number of countries. Korea faced serious problems in her financial and corporate sectors. This paper considers the performance of Korean nationwide banks before, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis. The performance of Korean nationwide banks took a big hit in 1998. Most banks recovered somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Among other standard findings, equity to assets correlates positively with bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number of institutions that performed poorly. The Asian crisis did not affect the normal rules of good bank management. The government, however, directly intervened in the banking sector on a large scale to limit the scope of the crisis in the Korean economy.
I.

Introduction:
The Asian financial crisis began July 2, 1997 with a devaluation of the Thai baht and quickly spread to other Asian countries. Later, Korea abandoned its defense of the Won November 17, 1997. The effects of the crisis on countries differed in its intensity. For example, some Asian economies did not reap the full whirlwind of dramatic consequences. According to some commentators, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan did not suffer as much as other countries because of trade and current account surpluses, significant holdings of foreign exchange reserves, and the relative absence of "crony capitalism" (Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini, 2001) .
Analysts suggest that the Asian financial crisis differs from prior crises in the importance of foreign lending. That is, recent capital flows into many Asian countries in response to the Asian miracle quickly exited once the crisis emerged. The loss of lending so quickly plunged financial institutions and corporations into a liquidity crisis. Moreover, some analysts (e.g., Radelet and Sachs 1998) cite the initial IMF rescue programs that required credit tightening as contributing to the severity of the problems.
The Korean situation possesses some important characteristics. Basic macroeconomic fundamentals were not signaling imminent danger (Cho and Hong, 2001; Hahm and Mishkin, 2000; Noland, 2000) . Korea experienced an investment boom in the manufacturing sector rather than a real estate boom that characterized other Asian economies. Moreover, the investment boom was financed with significant amounts of short-term capital inflows. The precarious position of the chaebols along with the regulation and supervision of Korean banks by the government set the stage for significant problems with the Asian financial crisis emerged.
Our paper considers the performance of Korean nationwide banks prior to, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis. 1 We examine how the profitability of these nationwide banks differ and identify factors that explain these differences. Our paper also adds significant value in two areas. First, we assemble probably the best panel data set on Korean nationwide banks during the1990s. Second, we capitalize on that panel data structure and employ the fixed-effect regression technique.
Korean nationwide banks suffered a dramatic decline in performance in 1998. Most banks recovered somewhat in 1999 with the notable exception of the further deterioration of Seoul. Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Equity to assets correlates positively with bank performance. That correlation emerges even though the Korean government injected massive amounts of equity capital into the large, poor-performing banks.
Non-interest income to interest income associates positively with bank performance and noninterest expense to interest expense associates negatively. Provisions for loan losses correlates negatively with bank performance. Finally, full-time employees associate positively with bank performance, which probably reflects the effects of poor bank performance on bank employment.
That is, nationwide banks downsized in 1998 as bank performance deteriorated.
The next section identifies those factors that characterize the Asian financial crisis, in general, and the Korea crisis, in particular. Section III discusses the data sources and describes the situation in the banking sector just before, during, and immediately after the Asian financial crisis. Section IV investigates the performance of Korean nationwide banks using panel regression techniques. Finally, Section V concludes.
II.
Asian Financial Crisis and the Korean Experience
This section discusses prevailing views about the Asian financial crisis, in general, and the Korean experience, in particular. We begin with a depiction of the Asian financial crisis and conclude with the analysis of the Korean situation.
Asian Financial Crisis 2
The Asian financial crisis is but the latest in a series of similar events that have affected the world's economy in the 1990s -for example, the 1994 Mexican peso collapse and the resulting turmoil in Latin America. Several studies (e.g., Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini 2001 , Kaminsky and Reinhart 2001 , and Tornell 2001 have examined those crises to determine whether they were due to "fundamentals" or "contagion." That is, were the countries that experienced a financial crisis vulnerable to such an event because of weak macroeconomic fundamentals (e.g., weak growth, high inflation, low foreign exchange reserves, troubled banking systems, and so on)? Or were they the "innocent" victims of a financial panic (contagion) that damaged countries' economies regardless of the strength of the underlying macroeconomic fundamentals?
The papers in Ito and Krueger (2001) examine the causes and consequences of the Asian financial crisis with comparisons to similar prior crises. That research reaches a consensus on several issues surrounding financial crises, in general, and the Asian crisis, in particular.
While contagion plays a role in the spread of a financial crisis, the magnitude of the negative effects experienced by countries in a crisis depends crucially on their macroeconomic fundamentals. Thus, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan escaped the more dramatic costs of the Asian financial crisis because of relatively strong macroeconomic fundamentals.
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One factor plays a major role in the Asian financial crisis vis-à-vis other similar events --the importance of foreign bank lending (Radelet and Sachs 1998 , Cho and Hong 2001 , Kaminsky and Reinhart 2001 , and Tornell 2001 . Banks supplied much credit to domestic firms.
Domestic banks came to rely more heavily on foreign bank lending. When the crisis reared its head, the supply of foreign lending evaporated quickly, confronting the domestic banks with a liquidity crisis. Further, some analysts argue that the initial International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue programs by requiring credit tightening worsened the liquidity crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998) .
Many Asian countries also possessed elements of "crony capitalism." Thus, the financial crisis caused some important corporate borrowers to default on their loans to the banks. This negative shock was reinforced and compounded by the loss of foreign lending to domestic banks.
Impending bank failures necessitated the intervention by the central bank to assist in finding potential merger partners (possibly foreign) or to take over operations of the failed banks itself.
Korean Situation 4
When the Asian financial crisis hit, the Korean macroeconomic fundamentals were not overly weak -high growth, low inflation, and low current account deficits -but were also not overly strong -low international reserves and low foreign direct investment relative to gross domestic product (Cho and Hong, 2001) . Moreover, poor Korean government regulation and supervision of the banking system generated a structural vulnerability in the banking and financial markets that aided and abetted the negative consequences of the Asian crisis. Furthermore, the bankruptcies of several chaebols (e.g., Kia, Hanbo, Haitai, Sammi, and Daewoo) along with standstill agreements and syndicated loans to a number of other chaebols prompted the flight of foreign lending, especially foreign bank lending. Within the banking system, the government began looking for potential merger partners for two, "too-big-to-fail" major banks (Korea First and Seoul). A foreign buyer did eventually acquire Korea First and the government still seeks a merger partner for Seoul.
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Hahm and Mishkin (2000) 8 Bank of Korea (1990) and Gilbert and Wilson (1998) provide valuable background information on the issues. Deregulation in the early 1980s expanded the power of commercial banks. Commercial banks could now, for example, offer credit cards, issue negotiable certificates of deposit, provide automated teller machines, and so on. Simultaneously, foreign exchange controls and restrictions on foreign ownership of Korean assets eased. The government's hand was, nonetheless, still a potent force, controlling interest rates on certain types of loans and deposits. Further, the government's informal credit policy continued to favor selected sectors. Gilbert and Wilson (1998) argue that the Korean commercial banking system was in critical condition in the mid-1980s with significant levels of bad loans. No Korean bank failed at this time, however, as charge-off rates for bad loans were slow While the Asian financial crisis precipitated the dramatic domestic economic crisis in Korea, more fundamental causes were at fault. 9 The corporate sector overextended itself with too much investment and borrowing. Commercial banks relied too heavily on short-term foreign lending as a source of funds. Finally, the lack of transparency of balance sheets, income statements, and management practices all led to a crisis of confidence in Korean institutions. In sum, the Korean economy was an "accident waiting to happen."
10 Table 1 reports the returns on assets and equity for the nationwide banks in our sample.
Several observations emerge. First, the Asian financial crisis dramatically affected the returns on assets and equity with Cho-Hung, Korea First, Hanil, Seoul, Dong-Wha, Dong-Nam, Dae-Dong, and Pyong-Wha each experiencing a more than 10 percent rate of loss on equity in 1997. With the exception of Cho-Hung and Pyong-Wha, these banks either disappeared through merger or were "too big too fail" and received assistance from the Bank of Korea, who began looking for foreign merger partners. Moreover, with few exceptions, the performance of all banks in terms of enough to maintain individual bank viability. No such luck (skill) graced the Korean commercial banking industry during the Asian financial crisis.
9 The next few paragraphs rely on information from Bank of Korea (1998).
10 Korea First and Seoul became insolvent during the Asian financial crisis. They were seen as "too-big-to-fail" institutions. Thus, the government nationalized and recapitalized them in January 1998. Researchers suggest that foreign lending to domestic banks played an important role in the Asian financial crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1998 , Cho and Hong 2001 , Kaminsky and Reinhart 2001 , and Tornell 2001 . That is, the Asian crisis precipitated a loss of foreign-source liabilities, exerting strong pressure on those banks with an illiquid asset base. If accurate, then we expect to see retrenchment in bank portfolios -declining assets and/or deposits. We do not observe such movements by in large for the Korean nationwide banks. Table 2 reports consolidated balance sheet information for Korean nationwide banks.
Total assets climbed continually from 1991 through 1998, and fell only slightly in 1999.
Deposits also climbed steadily over the entire 1991 to 1999 period. In short, the consolidated balance sheet of the Korean nationwide banks does not provide much ammunition for the hypothesis that the withdrawal of foreign-source liabilities played a significant role in the purchased only the "sound" assets. The actual June 1998 P&As included Kook-Min acquiring Dae-Dong, Housing & Commercial acquiring Dong-Nam, and Shinhan acquiring Dong-Wha.
Korean economic woes after the Asian financial crisis. If foreign-source liabilities were withdrawn from Korean nationwide banks, then such loses were replaced from domestic sources.
To offer a related insight to that last observation, Table 2 also reports information on foreign-currency loans and foreign-currency deposits. Both items, measured in Won, decrease after the Asian financial crisis. Unfortunately, we do not know whether the lost loans and deposits were domestic or foreign residents, since that data are not available.
The holding of foreign-currency loans and foreign-currency deposits do expose banks to foreign exchange risk as long as foreign-currency loans exceed, or fall short of, foreign-currency deposits. For example, if foreign-currency loans exceed foreign-currency deposits, then a weakening Won increases the Won value of foreign-currency loans more than deposits, adding to the equity base. Of course, a strengthening Won squeezes the equity base. 14 We note that foreign-currency loans and deposits rise and fall together with those loans exceeding deposits in every year except 1997.
By in large, Korean nationwide banks did respond to the shocks from the Asian financial crisis to the extent that they could respond. In general, loans did not change by much between 1997 and 1998 while securities nearly doubled (see Table 2 ) as banks tried to reduce the income risk that they faced. Loans and securities both showed modest increases in 1999, keeping the new post-1997 distribution between the two relatively constant.
The number of domestic branches of nationwide banks and the number of full-time employees (see Table 2 ) responded to events in 1997. Bank managers modified the decline in bank performance by reducing the number of branches somewhat and dramatically reducing the number of full-time employees in 1998. The number of branches and full-time employees stabilized between 1998 and 1999 with branches still falling, but by a smaller amount, and fulltime employees increasing marginally.
IV. Explaining Korean Nationwide Bank Performance
Our data include all nationwide banks in operation in any year from 1991 to 1999. Since some banks entered and/or exited over the sample period, we have an unbalanced panel data set of 124
observations -144 observations with 20 missing values. The data include balance sheet and income statement data on these banks. In addition, we collected some macroeconomic information that change over time, but do not differ between banks at a point in time.
Our econometric investigation looks for possible correlations between the balance sheet and income statement information as well as the macroeconomic data, and our measures of bank performance returns on assets and equity. Our results divide into sets of three regressions. In each set, the first regression considers five different types of individual bank explanatory variables: (1) portfolio distribution variables --loans to assets, securities to assets, deposits to assets, and equity to assets; (2) income distribution variables -non-interest income to interest income and non-interest expense to interest expense; (3) a risk variable -provision for loan losses to loans; (4) factor inputs -number of branches and full-time employees; and (5) a scale variable -total assets. The second regression broadens the portfolio distribution variables and adds two variables to capture the distribution of loans --won-denominated loans and foreigncurrency loans to total loans 15 --and two variables to capture the distribution of deposits -time deposits to won-denominated deposits and foreign-currency-denominated deposits to total 14 The database does not provide the breakdown of foreign-currency loans and deposits into individual currencies.
15 Total loans also include domestic import usance loans and advances for customers.
deposits. 16 The third regression broadens the loan distribution variables by adding the fractions of won-denominated loans in real estate (housing), consumer (household), and commercial categories (enterprises).
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We perform these three regressions with progressively finer disaggregations both with and without the macroeconomic variables. The macroeconomic variables include the unemployment rate, the rate of growth of real gross domestic product, the rate of depreciation of the Won, the fiscal budget surplus as a fraction of nominal gross domestic product, and the rate of inflation in the consumer price index.
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The standard method in empirical bank studies estimates regression equations with pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), which assumes that the omitted variables are independent of the regressors and are independently, identically distributed. Such estimation, however, can create problems of interpretation if bank-specific characteristics, such as bank management, that affect performance are not considered. If those omitted bank-specific variables (both observed and unobserved) correlate with the explanatory variables, then pooled OLS produces biased and inconsistent coefficient estimates (see Hsiao, 1986) . Using panel data, however, the fixed-effect model produces unbiased and consistent estimates of the coefficients.
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The fixed-effect model assumes that differences across banks reflect parametric shifts in the regression equation. Such an interpretation becomes more appropriate when the problem at 16 The data divide won-denominated deposits into demand and time and savings deposits while total deposits divide into won-denominated and foreign-currency-denominated deposits.
17 The other categories of loans incorporated under won-denominated loans include loans to the public sector and loans to special savings. 18 We also repeat all regressions where we add an Asian financial crisis dummy variable (coded one in 1997, 1998, and 1999 ; zero otherwise) and interact it with each independent variable to see if the effects change significantly between the pre-and post-Asian crisis. Generally, the findings are not altered by the Asian financial crisis. We report where the results differ in the footnotes. 19 Other methods of excluding unobserved country-specific variables estimates the first-differenced regression and hand uses the whole population, rather than a sample from it. Since our sample considers all 16
Korean nationwide banks over a particular time period, we adopt the fixed-effect model for our analysis if the omitted country-specific variables correlate with the included regressors.
Before reporting the regression results, some background discussion on the sequence of events in our research will provide useful information. When we originally collected the data and began the econometric analysis (early 2000), the 1999 data were not yet available. Those data became available in June 2000. As a result, we originally performed our fixed effect regressions using 1991 to 1998 data and then updated our analysis with the 1991 to 1999 data set.
Several important general differences emerged in the two sets of results. First, the 1991 to 1998 data provide a much better fit as well as a larger number of significant variables. Second, the 1991 to 1998 data produce significant effects for the macroeconomic variables (available on request); the 1991 to 1999 data do not. Finally, the 1991 to 1999 data generate coefficient estimates that sometimes change signs from their 1991 to 1998 counterparts, leading to counterintuitive effects.
Such large changes in results from adding data from 1999, with hindsight, seems a probable outcome, since the post-Asian-financial-crisis data are much noisier. The government's hand in nationalization of several institutions and in recapitalizing many others likely altered normal relationships. A quick look at Table 1 suggests that amongst the nationwide banks, Seoul appears to have followed a different path in 1999. Seoul's returns on assets and equity deteriorated further in 1999 when other banks experienced some relief from the difficulties in 1998. Moreover, while the government finally found a foreign purchaser for Korea First, Seoul remains at the alter awaiting a proper suitor.
the random-effects model (see Hsiao 1986 , and Westbrook and Tybout 1993).
We delete the 1999 Seoul observation, converting our data set to an unbalanced panel of 144 with 21 missing values. The sign-reversing coefficients and counterintuitive effects now disappear. The regressions for 1991 to 1999 still do not have as good a fit and the macroeconomic variables still are generally not significant. The lack of significant effects from the macroeconomic variables probably reflects the fact that the macroeconomic fundamentals were important pre-Asian financial crisis, but not so after. The government's role in the financial sector had diminished since the 1980s only to be reversed by the Asian financial crisis. So it may not be surprising that macroeconomic variables provide less explanatory power of bank performance once the years following the Asian financial crisis are added to the data. Tables 3 and 4 . Several observations deserve mention. First, higher capital adequacy (equity to assets) associates positively with both the rates of return (return on assets and equity). That result emerges even as the government recapitalized several banks. That is, banks with significant financial problems receive an injection of new equity that should raise the equity to asset ratio. Such recapitalizations presumably impart a negative correlation. Thus, the highly significant and positive association between capital adequacy and rates of return must offset this government-induced negative association.
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Second, non-interest income to interest income possesses a strong positive correlation with the rates of return on assets and equity while non-interest expense to interest expense possesses a strong negative correlation. Banks perform better as they increase their income 20 Moreover, the positive effect of equity to assets on return on equity strengthens after the Asian financial crisis begins. That is, the interaction of the equity to assets variables with the Asian financial crisis dummy variables is emanating from non-interest sources and reduce their expenses from non-interest sources. We know that banks reacted to the crisis by economizing initially on full-time employees and branches -two components of non-interest expense. Further, interest income associates with bank lending in large part. The problems of nonperforming loans are lessened in those banks that rely less on interest income.
Third, provisions for loan losses to total loans has a strong negative correlation with the returns on assets and equity, not a surprising result. The provision for loan losses crudely signals the riskiness of banks. Thus, higher loan loss provisions signal higher risk and associates negatively with bank returns.
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Fourth, the number of full-time employees has a strong positive correlation with the returns on assets and equity. Significant downsizing in full-time employees has been one response to the poor performance of Korean nationwide banks. Thus, that positive correlation probably reflects the decline in full-time employees necessitated by the fall in the return on assets and equity. In other words, we suspect reverse causality -low performance prompts lower full-time employment. It does not suggest that hiring more full-time employees will boost bank returns, quite the contrary.
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significantly positive in the return on equity regression. 21 That negative effect reflects the situation after the Asian financial crisis. That is, the provision for loan losses interacted with the Asian financial crisis dummy variable possesses a significant negative coefficient while the coefficient of provision for loan losses by itself that reflects the pre-crisis period of 1991 to 1996 is no longer significant. 22 The 1991 to 1998 data produce a strong positive correlation between the number of bank branches and the returns on assets and equity (not shown, available on request). Banks again reduced branches in response to declining bank performance in 1998. That significant positive effect disappears when we add the 1999 data.
Finally, the evidence for other significant variables in the return on assets and equity regressions is spotty and not persistent across the various specifications. Moreover, those variables that are significant tend to be so at a lower level (i.e., 10-percent level).
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V. Conclusion
The Asian financial crisis is but one of a series of recent crises that have hit the world's economies. Analysts suggest that it differ from prior crises in the importance of foreign lending.
Moreover, others (e.g., Radelet and Sachs 1998) Several factors possess strong correlations with bank performance. Equity to assets correlates 23 The macroeconomic variables are generally significant for the 1991 to 1998 sample period (not shown, available on request). An appreciating won has a strong positive correlation with the returns on assets and equity. A higher fiscal surplus to gross domestic product and a higher inflation rate in the consumer price index possess a positive correlation with performance. A higher growth rate of real gross domestic product associates with lower performance. Unemployment, however, does not significantly affect performance, even for the 1991 to 1998 period.
positively with bank performance, even when the government recapitalized a number of institutions that performed poorly. Non-interest income to interest income associates positively with bank performance and non-interest expense to interest expense associates negatively.
Provisions for loan losses correlates negatively with bank performance as one expects. Finally, full-time employees associates positively with bank performance, which at first thought seems counterintuitive. As noted in the text, that effect probably reflects the effects of poor bank performance on bank employment. That is, nationwide banks downsized significantly in 1998 as bank performance deteriorated.
Our findings suggest that the normal rules associated with sound bank management were not overturned or repealed by the Asian financial crisis. The government, however, was required to intervene to prevent the crisis from lengthening or from spreading more deeply into the Korean economy. The future health of the banking system requires serious restructuring of the past linkages between banks, chaebols, and the government. Banks must freely pursue their own corporate goals and must not have their actions tied by decisions by the other two groups.
In sum, the Korean economy and financial sector has so far weathered a huge financial storm. But the oceans are not yet safe; the storm continues. Much progress has occurred in restructuring the financial sector. Less progress has occurred in the restructuring of the chaebols.
This story has not yet seen its last chapter.
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